actions is vested in the federal district courts."
The time limitations for asserting these remedies have sparked considerable controversy in the courts. 9 Some have held that the time limits must be construed literally and strictly and therefore have concluded that they lack jurisdiction over late charges. 10 A consequence of this "jurisdictional" characterization is that the requirement is absolute, cannot be waived, and may be raised either by a party or by the court on its own motion at any time. 1 Other courts have held that the limitations are not jurisdictional, but operate like statutes of limitation. 2 A consequence of this characterization is that noncompliance with the time limit sometimes may be excused, because statutes of limitation, although facially absolute, usually are subject to equitable modification in accordance with well-established principles. 1 3 Such relief might take the form of delaying the time from which the statute runs (if, for example, the defendant fraudulently concealed the existence of the violation) 1 4 or estopping the defendant from pleading the statute as a defense (if, for example, he agreed not to raise it, and the plaintiff relied on that promise). 15 Still other courts have adopted an eclectic mix of these two characterizations, calling the limitations jurisdictional but allowing equitable tolling nevertheless. 6 9 Most of the controversy has centered on the time limit for filing charges with the EEOC. At least one case has surmised that equitable tolling may be appropriate in the context of the initial filing requirement but not in the context of other time limitations. Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1213 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980) . The rationale was that once a complainant has surmounted the hurdle of the initial filing, he is probably well-informed about his rights and obligations, so that any later delay would be less excusable. This argument goes only to the likelihood that equitable modification will be appropriate, however, and does not present a compelling reason for precluding such modification in all cases. This comment's conclusions therefore apply to all Title VII time limitations. Accordingly, the notes that follow do not specify which time limitation each cited case construed.
10 See text and notes at notes 19-22 infra. n FED. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3).
12 See text and notes at notes 31-36 infra. '3 See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) ("This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation. If the Federal Farm Loan Act had an explicit statute of limitation.., the time would not have begun to run until after petitioners had discovered, or had failed in reasonable diligence to discover, the alleged deception ....
). 14 E.g., Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 930 (5th Cir. 1975 ). This kind of relief involves an accrual rule.
15 E.g., Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255, 259 (6th Cir. 1979 ). This kind of relief involves a tolling rule.
11 See text and note at note 30 infra.
terpretation, rarely championed by the courts, is that the time limitations are "substantive statutes of limitation" that circumscribe the right and not merely the remedy and therefore cannot be modified. 1 7 Most of the academic commentary on this question has examined the inconclusive language of the statute, its problematic legislative history, and conflicting policy arguments in an effort to prove positively that the time limitations are statutes of limitation and not absolute. 18 There has been a shortage, however, of critical analysis of the opposing interpretations; accordingly, this comment examines the origins and bases of those readings of the statute. Finding that each is unsatisfactory, it concludes that equitable modification should be allowed under Title VII, as it is under similar statutes, in the absence of any evidence that Congress meant to preclude it.
I. TIME LIMITATIONS AS A CONDITION OF SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION
In several early cases, federal appellate courts characterized Title VII time limitations as "jurisdictional prerequisites," although that description was either dictum or not critical to the outcome. 1 Cir. 1973 ) (timely filing is a jurisdictional prerequisite, but because plaintiff alleged a continuing violation the time limit had not run); Vigil v. AT&T, 455 F.2d 1222 , 1224 (10th Cir. 1972 ) (filing with EEOC during period when state agency had exclusive jurisdiction met jurisdictional requirement); Harris v. National Tea Co., 454 F.2d 307, 312 (7th Cir. 1971 ) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper when plaintiff did not file within the time limit and presented no good reason to toll the limit); Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Co., 437 F.2d 1136 , 1139 (5th Cir. 1971 ) (although EEOC had found no reasonable cause to believe there was discrimination, complaint satisfied "minimal jurisdictional requirements"); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1969 ) (not every member of a class must meet the "jurisdictional prerequisite" of timely filing); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor phrase several times in dictum. 0 This apparent endorsement of the notion, although its implications had not been articulated, led some courts to conclude that the usual iron consequences of jurisdictional prerequisites must apply. 2 1 Other courts repeated the "jurisdictional prerequisite" language even when noting that no circumstances could support equitable modification in the cases before them; they therefore left unclear whether the "jurisdictional" characterization was mere dictum. The difficulty with this extensive body of authoritys is that no court has ever expounded any reason for considering the requirements to be jurisdictional. 2 4 Conditions that narrow the federal courts' jurisdiction to smaller confines than their full constitutional range, such as the amount in controversy requirement, 2 5 simply affect the allocation of cases between state and federal courts. 26 Unlike such jurisdictional conditions, the time limitations of Title VII define the merits of the claim and therefore serve a very different purpose. 27 As the Supreme Court has noted, that purpose is the promotion of fairness to all parties through the prevention of stale claims 8 -a purpose generally served by statutes of limitation. [A] claim that is not timely filed is subject to dismissal either on the ground that the plaintiff has not stated a claim for which relief could be granted, or, if the facts do not appear on the face of the pleadings, on motion for summary judgment. But these are dismissals because the claim has no merit, not because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction when a claim before it is defective on the merits. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946 Congress did express concern for the need of time limitations in the fair operation of the Act, but that concern was directed entirely to the initial filing of a charge with the EEOC and prompt notification thereafter to the alleged violator. The bills passed in both the House and Senate contained short time periods within which charges were to be filed with the EEOC and notice given to the employer. And the debates and reports in both Houses made evident that the statute of limitations problem was perceived in terms of these provisions.... The fact that the only statute of limitations discussions in Congress were directed to the period preceding the filing of an initial charge is wholly consistent with the Act's overall enforcement structure ....
The sheer bulk of the dicta declaring the time limits to be jurisdictional has caused courts uncomfortable with that interpretation to resort to curious evasions. In many cases they have retained the jurisdictional label but changed its meaning. For instance, one court held that "Title VII time limitations are jurisdictional in the sense that the phrase is used in relation to statutes of limitations and equitable principles should apply in circumstances which warrant their application." 30 Courts that reject the jurisdictional label outright, 31 on the other hand, have taken the defensive, seeking to prove the obvious proposition that the time periods specified in the statute are "periods of limitation" by citation to unsurprising statements in the committee reports and congressional debates to that effect. 32 They bolster this conclusion by noting the remedial nature of the statute and the fact that the charges must be filed by laymen, 33 reasoning " See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1975) (a statute of limitation "reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones"). In appropriate circumstances, equitable modification is allowed despite this legislative balance because the assumptions underlying the balance do not include misconduct on the defendant's part. Modifying the time limitation prevents such a defendant from "profiting from his own wrong." Glus v. Brooklyn E. that if equitable modification is sometimes called for, the time limits must not be jurisdictional. Sometimes the courts note that the section of the statute that establishes federal jurisdiction over these cases is unqualified.
3 4 Finally, they argue that the time limitations do not behave like jurisdictional requirements: for example, although every member in a typical class action must meet the usual amount in controversy requirement, 5 not every Title VII class member needs to file a timely charge. 3 6 If some of these arguments seem strained, it is only because the courts have been forced to disprove an unlikely proposition, for neither the statute itself nor anyone in Congress called the time limitations jurisdictional, and those limitations serve no jurisdictional purpose. Proponents of the jurisdictional interpretation should be the ones citing support for their reading. Instead, repetition of the dictum seems to have convinced them that the statute itself makes that reading obvious. 87 That dictum appears to have arisen from a careless use of language. One of the early appellate cases calling the time limits a "jurisdictional prerequisite" used the term interchangeably with "condition precedent. ' 3 8 In addition, other courts have held that the requirement of filing suit with the EEOC to allow an opportunity for conciliation before resorting to the courts is an exhaustion-of-remedies requirement."' Neither of these formulations requires that equitable modification principles be forbidden in the administrative stage of the proceedings; they serve only to route the complaint through that stage before reaching court. 40 The time limitations therefore need not be absolute. More importantly, a federal district court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction even if, with the aid of appropriate equitable modification principles, a claim fails to meet an exhaustion requirement. 41 It is erroneous, therefore, to call such a prerequisite "jurisdictional."
The use of that label may have received some encouragement from analogies to the treatment of time limitations on other federally-created rights of action, such as the one contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 42 Under such statutes, which create rights of action against the government, failure strictly to meet time limitations has been said to deprive the court of jurisdiction. 4 REv. 457 (1977) .
When Title VII was amended in 1972 and the 90-day limit for filing charges with the EEOC was increased to 180 days, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976)), Congress did not make clear whether equitable modification should be allowed, although some evidence points in that direction. See 118 CONG. REc. 4941 (1972) (section-by-section analysis placed in the record by Sen. Williams of New Jersey):
In establishing the new time period for the filing of charges, it is not intended that existing law, which has shown an inclination to interpret this type of time limitation to give the aggrieved person the maximum benefit of the law, should be in any way circumscribed. Existing case law which has determined that certain types of violations are continuing in nature, thereby measuring the running of the required time period from the last occurrence of the discrimination and not from the first occurrence is continued, and other interpretations of the courts maximizing the coverage of the law are not Similarly, the time limitation in section 10(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 51 a statute often used as a model in explicating Title VII's procedural scheme, 2 has been held repeatedly to be a statute of limitation rather than a condition of jurisdiction. 5
II. TIME LIMITATIONS AS A CONDITION OF THE RIGHT RATHER THAN THE REMEDY
Another analysis of Title VII's time limitations, distinct from the jurisdictional interpretation, occasionally has been used by the courts to reach a similar result. 54 This analysis holds that the limiaffected. It is intended by expanding the time period for filing charges in this subsection that aggrieved individuals, who frequently are untrained laymen who are not always aware of the discrimination which is practiced against them, should be given a greater opportunity to prepare their charges and file their complaints, and that existent but undiscovered acts of discrimination should not escape the effect of the law through a procedural oversight. See also 118 CONG. REc. 7167 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
When the ADEA was amended in 1978, by contrast, Congress clearly indicated that the time limits should not be absolute, even though it did not alter the time There are two avenues by which one might reach the conclusion that a time limit circumscribes an underlying right. Neither of these explanations, however, satisfactorily justifies the treatment of Title VII limitations as absolute.
A. Substantive Statutes of Limitation
The first line of analysis is grounded on an old theory that some statutes of limitation merely are procedural and therefore can be modified as equity dictates, but that others, labeled substantive, are an integral part of the right itself and therefore are inflexible. The original purpose of the "substantive" label, how-" [I]n a statutory scheme in which Congress carefully prescribed a series of deadlines measured by numbers of days-rather than months or years-we may not simply interject an additional 60-day period into the procedural scheme. We must respect the compromise embodied in the words chosen by Congress. It is not our place simply to alter the balance struck by Congress in procedural statutes by favoring one side or the other in matters of statutory construction. It should be noted, however, that in Mohasco the plaintiff was arguing for a generalized extension, rather than one fashioned by equitable principles to fit particular circumstances.
It also should be noted that in Robbins & Myers, the Court permitted a claim against which the old 90-day limitation had run to be revived by the later extension of that limitation. 429 U.S. at 243-44. If the expiration of the time limit really had extinguished the underlying claim, such a revival would not have been possible. ever, does not require inflexibility, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged.6 0
The theory arose as a conflict of laws principle. The usual common law conflicts rule held that when a right created by one state was sued upon in another, the statute of limitation of the forum state controlled." 1 The rationale for this rule was that statutes of limitation are matters of procedure, and the forum's procedure is always used. 2 In some situations, however, reliance on the statute of limitation of the state that created the right was perceived to be more appropriate. 6 3 This occurred whenever the limitation was integrally attached to the right. 6 4 Such limitations naturally came to be called "substantive" to distinguish them from ordinary "procedural" statutes of limitation.
The purpose of the distinction was merely to decide which state's limitation (and, presumably, rules of equitable modification) applied. 5 A consequence of the "substantive" label, however, was that some courts held such limitations to be absolute and inflexible. 6 This conclusion was fueled by an early Supreme Court description of such a statute:
The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the 62 Id. at 3-4. *' This perception first arose when the forum state's period of limitation was longer than the one of the source of the right, and courts wished to choose the shorter. Id. at 21-22.
" See Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904) . Various tests for determining the existence of such integration have been employed. These include a "specificity" test (the limitation is not a generalized statute of limitation, but tailored for a specific right), a "built-in" test (the limitation is contained in the statute creating the right), an "attributes" test (the limitation has attributes the forum state considers to be substantive), and a "foreign courts" test (the limitation is considered substantive by courts of its home state This principle has no application to Title VII, whose language is not so clear. Although it is true that Title VII was the product of a bitterly contested compromise, 7 4 nothing in the way the compromise provision was framed demands an absolute bar that would override the presumption that equitable modification is available. 
CONCLUSION
The treatment of Title VII's time limitations has been unduly confused. Part of this confusion stems from a failure to distinguish the purpose and scope of several rules of construction, such as those requiring inflexibility because the action is permitted only by waiver of sovereign immunity, because Congress expressly so limited the right, or because the statute of limitation is substantive . 7 Still more disharmony stems from relying at all on the last of these rules when Supreme Court precedents and good sense show that it is spurious to do so. The ill-advised labeling of prerequisites to suit as "jurisdictional" has added to the confusion. When these false analyses are undermined, the foundation of absolute construction crumbles. Analogies to similar statutes whose time limitations may be modified equitably confirm that the provisions of Title VII demand similar construction.
